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Central bank policy suﬀers from time-inconsistency when facing a banking crisis:
A bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard.
Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping
even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so. Dollarization is good when the costs
of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high, monitoring eﬀort by the
banker is important in improving returns, and when the cost of liquidating projects
is moderate. However, a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization
undesirable. The results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization
in a range of countries and the potential role of the IMF as International LOLR.
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I Introduction
We would never put ourselves in a position where we envisioned actions
that we would take would be of assistance to the rest of the world but to the
detriment of the United States
Dollarization means that the country adopts the currency of another country (for example, the dollar)
as a means of payment and unit of account.
A currency board is typically deAned by a legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for the
reserve currency at a Axed rate and by the requirement that (a major proportion of) monetary liabilities be
backed by the reserve currency.
Estonia considers its currency boards as a step towards joining the European Monetary Union. Lithuania
plans to link its currency board to the euro in 2001. Dollar-based currency boards have been established
also in Djibouti [1949] and the member countries of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank [1965]. The one in
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Alan Greenspan to a congressional panel in 1999 (IHT, Jan.19, 2000)
The aim of this paper is to examine the trade-oﬀs associated with the move to dol-
larization from the perspective of the stability of the banking system in a small open
economy.
Dollarization is a reality in several countries and is on the agenda for others. Arrange-
ments short of full dollarization, or adoption of the currency of another country, include
currency boards, with a rigid link between domestic currency and foreign reserves , and
partial dollarization. Dollarization is not very common but is gaining ground. Starting
with Panama in 1904, Ecuador embraced full dollarization in 2000, after the collapse of
its Anancial system in 1998-99 at the staggering cost up to 22 percent of GDP, and El
Salvador very recently in January 2001. Guatemala is also planning to circulate the dol-
lar and Estonia is thinking about GeuroizationG. Currency boards were a more common
arrangement in the British colonial past and presently they are in operation, among oth-
ers, in Argentina [1991], Hong Kong [1983] and in Lithuania [1994], linked to the dollar,
as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina [1997], Estonia [1992] and Bulgaria [1997], linked to the
DM/euro. Turkey moved recently to a quasi currency board arrangement. Furthermore,
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Brunei Darussalam [1967] is linked to the Singapore dollar. See Santiprabhob [1997] and Ghosh, Gulde and
Wolf [2000] for a description of the arrangements in the diﬀerent currency boards.
See IMF [1999].
See for example Caprio and Klingebiel [1996] and Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu [1997].
For example, Calomiris and Powell [2000] state that Gthe banking sector suﬀered from ineﬀective reg-
ulation and supervision and repeated, forced government rescues contributed signiAcantly to ArgentinaKs
past Ascal and inLationary problemsG. A related problem (in Argentina, for example) is the lack of legal
protection that a supervisor has when attempting to discipline a bank in trouble. Then even if the perceived
problem is serious the bank may be allowed to continue or even granted help. See World Bank [1998].
See Calomiris [1998], Eichengreen [1999], Fisher [1999] and the GSymposium on Global Financial Insta-
partial dollarization is prevalent in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Turkey
with dollar deposits equal to more than 30 percent of the total.
The adoption of a common currency reduces the transaction costs of trade (see, for
example, Rose [2000]) and if the country adopts a stable currency it commits to a stable
monetary policy. The latter may be particularly important in emergent economies. How-
ever, dollarization has the potential cost of abandoning monetary policy and the exchange
rate as policy instruments and compromising the capacity to bail out the domestic banking
system. It is worth noting that banking crises can be very costly, with bail out costs up
to 10 percent or even 20 percent of GDP. We concentrate attention in this paper on the
bailout issue.
When it comes to bailouts, not being able to help may have its beneAts. As Grossman
and Hart [1982] pointed out, the threat of bankruptcy and loss of private beneAts can
motivate managers to exert eﬀort and improve the performance of the Arm. The possibility
of a bailout reduces this incentive eﬀect and indirectly encourages managerial shirking and
risk taking. It has been argued repeatedly that a major problem in emerging markets
is the implicit or explicit guarantee of a bailout in the event of a banking crisis (think
of Argentina, Mexico or Thailand). In emerging markets, moral hazard problems are
widespread and the economy relies in an important way on the monitoring eﬀort of bankers
who provide Anance to entrepreneurial projects. It is precisely the fear of bank closure or
change of management that makes bankers, who derive beneAts from running the bank,
cautious and willing to expend eﬀort to monitor projects.
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Journal of Economic PerspectivesbilityG of the , 1999, 13 (4), 3-65, for diﬀerent perspectives on the problem.
For example, in Argentina in the 1980s the average term in oﬃce for a central bank governor was less
than a year despite the fact that the legal term was four years. See Chapter 19 in Cukierman [1992].
In a monetary economy, the central bank can bail out distressed banks by extending
a line of credit. The optimal central bank policy must balance the costs and beneAts
of bailouts. On the one hand, a bailout avoids costly and ineﬃcient liquidation of en-
trepreneurial projects. On the other hand, the prospect of a bailout reduces the banksK
incentive to monitor. Ex ante, the central bank would like to make a commitment to close
the bank in some cases (for example, if the project returns are very low) and to extend
credit in others (for example, if the returns are only moderately low). Unfortunately, the
optimal policy suﬀers from a lack of time-consistency. Ex ante it is optimal for the central
bank to commit to a policy of Anancial discipline. Ex post, it may be optimal to avoid
costly liquidation by allowing banks and projects to continue in every case. Note that ex
post continuation is both eﬃcient and welcomed by the banker, who derives beneAts from
running the bank.
To sum up, a time-consistent policy by the central bank may lead to excessive bailouts.
Anticipating this lack of Anancial discipline, bankers will not make suﬃcient eﬀort to screen
and monitor projects. The result will be excessive Anancing of inferior projects, inadequate
monitoring, and poor project performance.
A commitment to Anancial discipline can sometimes be maintained if the central bank
has a strong incentive to build a reputation. In emerging markets, however, it may be
diﬃcult for central banks to build a reputation for disciplining banks, because the central
bankersK eﬀective horizon is short due to political instability. A central bank that cannot
build a reputation will face the time-inconsistency problem.
How can dollarization alleviate this problem? Dollarization represents a commitment
to a limited use of the lender of last resort (LOLR) facility, understood in a broad sense.
Dollarization implies that there cannot be recourse to monetary base expansion for bailouts.
In the extreme case of a small open economy, dollarization means that banking contracts
are written in real (dollar) terms. In a dollarized regime, help to the banking system
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For example, in Argentina a contingent liquidity facility with international banks is in place. This is
complemented with a liquidity requirement and holdings of excess reserves. The LOLR activity of the Central
bank is severely restricted by the Convertibility Law (adoption of a currency board) of 1991 and charter
of 1992. See Calomiris and Powell [2000]. Most currency boards have established limited LOLR facilities.
The exceptions are Brunei, Darussallam and Djibouti. Note also that a stabilization fund built to provide
liquidity when needed can be diverted to other ends (as in the cases of Mexico and Thailand).
See Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf [2000].
Chang and Velasco [1998a and b] introduce the exchange rate regime into consideration in a Diamond-
Dybvig type model.
(bailouts) must be arranged in advance, via stabilization funds and/or tax schemes, or
pre-contracted in the international market.
Calomiris and Powell (2000) provide some evidence that credible market discipline is
being established in Argentina. Namely, that market perceptions of default risk are mean
reverting, possibly indicating that banks are market-disciplined and respond to increases
in risk perception by being more prudent. Argentina, as well as Estonia, both with a
currency board, provide examples of countries where depositors have suﬀered signiAcant
losses following banking crises.
Dollarization is not a panacea, however. Whereas the domestic LOLR may impose too
little Anancial discipline, dollarization may impose too much. By constraining the central
bankKs role as LOLR, it may be impossible to extend assistance to a distressed bank even
in situations where this would be eﬃcient ex ante.
In this paper, we study the costs and beneAts of dollarization from the point of view
of providing market discipline for the banking sector. The model we use integrates the
banking instability model à la Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and the moral hazard view (see
Krugman [1998] for example) of crises. In the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig [1983],
banks are risk sharing institutions that transform liquid liabilities (demand deposits) into
illiquid assets (investments in long-term projects). In Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and
much of the following literature, panics are generated by self-fulAlling prophecies. This
coordination problem is not addressed in this paper. In our model, which is based on
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This is consistent with the evidence provided in Gorton [1988] and in Kaminsky and Reinhart [1999].
Bhattacharya and Jacklin [1988], and Postlewaite and Vives [1987] present an information-based view of
bank runs which is close to the one developed in the paper.
Allen and Gale [1998], crises are the result of exogenous shocks to asset returns. The
model is augmented by introducing the possibility of moral hazard. The model may be
of independent interest because it combines the two elements (moral hazard and Anancial
crises) that have been studied separately in the literature.
We approach the analysis of optimal policy in three steps. First, as a benchmark
in Section 3, we analyze the policy of a planner with full commitment who uses complete
contracts to Anance risky projects. We characterize the incentive-eﬃcient policy and show,
among other things, that the planner chooses the minimum probability of termination
(default) that is required to satisfy the incentive constraint (induce the optimal eﬀort from
the bank manager).
Secondly, we examine in Section 4 a competitive banking sector in a real economy where
banks use (incomplete) demand deposits to Anance risky projects. Banks are implicitly
assumed to be able to commit to demand deposits. The competitive equilibrium is third-
best (worse than the incentive-eﬃcient allocation) for two reasons. First, the probability
of default may be too high, leading to excessive costly liquidation. Secondly, even if the
probability of default is the same as in the incentive-eﬃcient solution, the allocation of risk
sharing may be ineﬃcient because of the restriction to (incomplete) deposit contracts.
Thirdly, we examine in Section 5 a competitive banking sector in a monetary econ-
omy. Banks use nominal demand deposits (i.e., demand deposits denominated in domestic
currency) to Anance risky projects. The central bank, through its control of the money
supply, can inLuence the real value of deposits and hence the probability of default. When
project returns are low, extension of credit to the bank allows the depositors to be paid
oﬀ in depreciated currency. If the central bank can commit to a monetary policy ex ante,
the incentive-eﬃcient allocation can be achieved through a competitive banking sector.
However, in the absence of full commitment, the central bank always extends credit ex
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II The Basic Model
post and the outcome is typically worse than the second best.
Comparison of these scenarios (in Section 6) allows us to weigh the costs and beneAts
of dollarization. In the case of a small, open economy, dollarization corresponds to the real
economy, in which market discpline may be excessive but does support high eﬀort by the
bank managers. Full use of the LOLR facility in a non-dollarized economy corresponds to
the case of a monetary economy without central bank commitment. Market discipline is
too low to support high eﬀort. Neither of these cases is second-best (incentive-eﬃcient).
Which is to be preferred depends on the parameters of the economy. We study also how
partial (and credible) dollarization could implement the incentive-eﬃcient solution. The
main contribution of the paper is to provide a framework in which to analyze the impact
of the diﬀerent parameters on the tradeoﬀ between the beneAts of market discipline and
the costs of liquidation.
Whether it is better to dollarize from the point of view of banking stability is an
empirical question. In a Arst attempt to measure the costs and beneAts of dollarization,
in Section 7 we survey a number of countries where dollarization can be beneAcial prima
facie, suggest some empirical counterparts to the parameters of our model, and identify
which countries are the leading candidates for dollarization.
Section 2 presents the model and concluding remarks, including a discussion of the
potential role of a reformed IMF, close the paper.
The basic structure of the model is drawn from Allen and Gale [1998]. There are three
dates . There is a single good that can be used for consumption and investment.
There are two kinds of investment technology, a safe, liquid investment and a risky, illiquid
investment. The liquid investment is modeled as a storage technology: one unit of the good
invested at date produces one unit of the good at date , for . The illiquid
investment should be thought of as a risky project that takes two periods to mature. The
returns to the risky project are linear: one unit of the good invested at date yields units
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of the good at date . The random variable has a support , where .
If the project is liquidated prematurely, it yields units of the good at date for each
unit invested at date . Liquidation is costly because . We are assuming that it
is impossible to liquidate a fraction of the project: either the entire project is liquidated
at date or it must continue until date .
There is a continuum of ex ante identical agents. At date each agent is endowed with
one unit of the good . Agents are subject to a time-preference shock at date . A fraction
of them will become , who only value consumption at date and
the remaining fraction will become , who only value consumption at
date . The parameter also represents the typical agentKs ex ante probability of becoming
an early consumer. Thus, the agentKs expected utility can be written as ,
where is the agentKs consumption at date and is a neoclassical utility
function (increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable).
At date all agents are ex ante identical and they hold the same beliefs on the returns
to investment. All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date : individual agents
learn whether they are early or late consumers and the returns to the risky investment
are revealed. A consumerKs type is not observable, so late consumers can always imitate
early consumers. Therefore, contracts explicitly contingent on this characteristic are not
feasible.
We assume that the risky project requires the supervision of a manager. In particular,
the probability distribution of returns to the risky asset depends on eﬀort undertaken
by the manager. For simplicity we assume that the managerKs eﬀort takes two values,
and the random variable has a probability density function (with
support ) that depends on the value of chosen at date . The cost of eﬀort to the
manager is if he chooses and it is zero if he chooses . The cost can
be interpreted as the beneAt that the manager derives from selecting GbadG projects (like
giving loans to friends and family or straight embezzlement). The manager also receives
a beneAt from continuing the project until date . Thus, the managerKs expected
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III The Incentive-Eﬃcient Solution
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The modelization is similar to Dewatripont and Tirole [1993, 1994]. Dewatripont and Tirole [1994], in a
somewhat more complex model, provide a discussion of the reasons why managers prefer continuation even
in the presence of monetary beneAts.
payoﬀ is where is the probability that the project is continued at date .
The managerKs eﬀort cannot be observed and, therefore, his willingness to undertake eﬀort
will depend on the relationship between his eﬀort and the probability that the project is
continued at date . The present formulation is overly simpliAed but it is the simplest way
of presenting the managerKs choice of eﬀort and allows us to focus on the bankruptcy point
as the critical variable. Despite this simpliAcation, the characterization of the contracting
problem is far from trivial and the model allows for a trade-oﬀ between too much and too
little discipline.
Suppose that a planner were given the task of choosing an optimal risk-sharing arrange-
ment. Since all agents are ex ante identical, it is natural for the planner to treat all agents
alike and maximize their ex ante expected utility. Let denote the portfolio chosen
at date , where is the investment in the risky asset and is the investment in the safe
asset, let denote eﬀort level, and let denote the probability of continuation at date
1 when takes the value . The optimal consumption allocation will depend only on
the aggregate wealth of the economy. Let denote the optimal consumption
allocation, where is the consumption at date when .
The plannerKs problem can be solved in stages. First, we solve the problem taking as
given the Arst-period decisions regarding and and the realized value of . If the project
is discontinued, the aggregate wealth available is and the problem solved by the
planner is
subject to
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The gist of the proof is the following. The necessary conditions for optimization require that
with equality if . Given concavity of this means that the incentive constraint
is automatically satisAed. Now, if returns are low, , then we are in the case
and the consumptions of early and late consumers are equated (for the late consumers
of the asset is carried to date which added to yields the desired ). If returns
The Arst constraint is the budget constraint at date . It requires that the consumption of
the early and late consumers be less than or equal to the liquidated value of the portfolio.
Although the project is discontinued at date , the planner is assumed to pay out the
consumption to the late consumers at date using the storage technology. This allows
him to take advantage of the fact that early consumers cannot wait and so cannot imitate
late consumers. As a result, only one incentive constraint has to be satisAed. The second
constraint is the incentive constraint. It requires that late consumers do not beneAt from
imitating early consumers (a late consumer can pretend to be an early consumer, receive
at date and save it until date using the storage technology).
The solution to this problem is and the maximum utility from
discontinuing the project is
Next, suppose that the project is continued at date . Then the planner has units
of the good at date and units of the good at date . He chooses a consumption
allocation to solve the following problem:
subject to
The Arst constraint is the budget constraint at date , the second constraint is the budget
constraint at date , and the third constraint is the incentive constraint. The solution
to this problem is: and the
maximum utility from continuing the project is
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are higher, , then we keep constant the consumption of early withdrawers giving them
all the output at date , , and we let late consumers proAt from the high returns at date ,
.
A suﬃcient condition for to be increasing in is that for
any . (See Gale and Vives (2001) for the proof.) If with the inequality holds
if and only if . This is true if and/or are small. However, the inequality does not hold if
(logarithm) or the utility function is of the CARA type.
Figure I below depicts the consumption allocations when the project is continued.
The manager always prefers to continue the project at date . Whether the consumers
are better oﬀ on average continuing the project depends on the parameters of the model.
Since we are interested in the problem of time consistency, it makes sense to assume that
the consumers are, on average, better oﬀ continuing the project ex post. That is,
for all
For very small values of , this condition must be satisAed, so it will be satisAed everywhere
if is increasing in .
Now suppose that the planner has chosen a portfolio at date and consider the
choice of eﬀort. If the planner chooses , there is no problem implementing this choice.
Since the manager prefers not to make an eﬀort, the incentive constraint will automatically
be satisAed. Further, since it is ex post ineﬃcient to liquidate the project, it is optimal to
choose for all . In this case the planner solves
Denote by the value of the program. Note that is independent of , and
The interesting case, therefore, is the implementation of . The planner chooses
to maximize the expected utility of the representative depositor subject to the incen-
tive compatibility constraint to insure that the bank manager exerts eﬀort. The incentive
constraint says that taking high eﬀort increases the managerKs expected continuation ben-
eAt by an amount that is greater than or equal to his cost of eﬀort. Intuition suggests that,
if making an eﬀort is optimal, it is because higher eﬀort is associated with higher outcomes
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Otherwise it would be optimal to put . This, however, would not satisfy the incentive constraint
because and .
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For a given portfolio , suppose that is increasing
in and the MLRP holds. Then the optimal continuation probability is, for some constant
given by
for
for
and the incentive constraint for the banker is given by
for the risky project on average. So we should reward the manager for good outcomes and
should punish him for bad outcomes. We can show that under natural assumptions, the
optimal continuation probability does have the form of a cutoﬀ rule. If is
decreasing in we say that the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds. In this
case, Arst order stochastically dominates where denotes the cumu-
lative distribution function of given the eﬀort level . The next result gives suﬃcient
conditions for the optimal rule to be a cutoﬀ rule (see Gale and Vives (2001) for the proof).
Assuming that it is optimal to induce the planner must And a portfolio
and a cutoﬀ point that solve the following problem:
subject to
Denote the solution by . Note that the planner wants to keep as low
as possible. Indeed, if a Arst-best allocation can be achieved and it will be
optimal to put . It follows that the incentive constraint must be binding at
an optimum. Thus, is uniquely determined by the incentive constraint:
. Note that is weakly increasing in and
tends to as tends to zero.
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IV Competitive Banking
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When eﬀort is irrelevant, for all , it is impossible to achieve in an incentive-
compatible way and is not deAned.
A suﬃcient condition is that the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion be larger than .
Having determined the value of , we can choose to maximize the objective
function subject only to the Arst-period budget constraint. A typical solution is depicted
in Figure I. For low returns, , the project is discontinued and .
For higher returns we are in the continuation region and consumptions follow the pattern
described above.
Denote by the value of the program when . Our maintained assumption
in the paper is that to induce managerial eﬀort is optimal, that is, .
Under certain regularity conditions , the optimal investment in the risky project is
increasing in (as it becomes cheaper to liquidate the project). This is always the case if
the project is liquidated whenever it loses money, . Let us assume so. Assume also
that when . This means that the inequality above holds for all
whenever .
We introduce a competitive banking sector in which banks are coalitions of agents that
pool their endowments and hire a manager to monitor their investment.
Like the planner, banks will maximize the expected utility of the representative mem-
ber subject to the investment technology and the managerKs incentive constraint. Unlike
the planner, banks cannot make the consumption allocation directly contingent on the
state of nature. Instead, they are forced to use non-contingent deposit contracts. (The
consumption allocation will be contingent on in the event that the bank cannot meet its
commitments, of course.) A deposit contract oﬀers the bank members a choice of units
of consumption at date or the residual units of consumption left at date .
The bank invests in a portfolio at date and the manager chooses the level of
eﬀort . If the bank can aﬀord to pay to all the agents who want to withdraw at date
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This is not the only equilibrium of the depositorsK game at date . Indeed, there could be a panic
equilibrium in which all depositors withdraw. This can be avoided with suspension of convertibility (c.f.,
Diamond and Dybvig [1983]).
the bank is solvent and the risky project can continue. Otherwise, the bank is bankrupt
and its portfolio must be liquidated and distributed to the agents. The bank will be solvent
if it can pay the early consumers what it owes them at date and if the late consumers are
willing to wait until date to withdraw. The aggregate consumption of the late consumers
is . Thus, the necessary conditions for solvency are and
. We assume that, whenever these inequalities are satisAed, the late consumers
are content to withdraw at date .
The critical value of at which the bank can just meet its obligations is denoted
by and implicitly deAned by For we have and
. For we have . So, we can equivalently think
of the bank as choosing a portfolio and a bankruptcy point . Then, assuming that
it is optimal to induce high eﬀort, the bankKs decision problem is to choose to
maximize the objective
subject to
where . Denote by the value of the program. is increasing in and
nonincreasing in Whenever the incentive compatibility constraint for the banker is
binding an increase in will decrease .
Obviously, the solution requires that , since the incentive constraint must be
satisAed. The banking solution will tend to have and, consequently, a higher
probability of failure. The reason is that the incentive-eﬃcient solution chooses the smallest
compatible with preserving incentives for the banker while at the banking solution the
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This assumes that is in the incentive compatible range for Recall also that
.
selection of the cutoﬀ determines also the level of for a given portfolio choice
(see Figure II). Therefore, a low may imply an excessively low consumption for early
consumers from the point of view of risk sharing. In contrast, the value of is determined
by the distribution and the ratio independently of the choice of . By
choosing the parameters of the model appropriately one can make arbitrarily small
without aﬀecting the value of For example, remember that as tends to , tends
to . Provided, as it is reasonable, that the optimal ignoring the managerKs incentive
constraint is greater than then, whenever is small, It is interesting to see
under what conditions will be high. To illustrate this, suppose that so that there
is no cost to default per se. Then a competitive bank will choose the same portfolio and
consumption allocation as in the incentive-eﬃcient solution (the second best). However,
to implement this consumption allocation with a deposit contract, it will be necessary to
choose . If the variance of is GhighG, one expects the amount of the safe asset to
be GhighG and this makes it likely that .
It is worth remarking that the (third-best) banking equilibrium is not the same as the
second-best, even if . If the probability of continuing is lower in the third best, the
bank manager will be strictly worse oﬀ than in the second best, even though the depositors
are indiﬀerent. Of course, the costs of Anancial distress may also be felt in the non-Anancial
sector of the economy (Bernanke and Gertler [1989]). If so, then the gap between and
will have consequences far more serious than the eﬀect on the managerKs utility (private
beneAts) of discontinuing the project. The assumption that is just a cheap way of
capturing the idea that Anancial fragility has real costs.
Note, moreover, that even if the expected utility typically attained at the
banking contract will be strictly less than at the incentive-eﬃcient solution, . This is
because the risk sharing provided by the banking contract is sub-optimal, even when the
bank is solvent. A typical solution to the banking contract is depicted in Figure II.
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V Banking in a monetary economy and optimal
central bank policy
We are thinking, therefore, of open market operations of liquidity control to help, possibly, a banking
system in trouble and not to help individual institutions.
Up to now we have assumed that the banking contract was speciAed in real terms (in
units of consumption). Let us now introduce a central bank that supplies money and
therefore makes it possible to write nominal contracts in terms of the domestic currency.
The dollar is the reserve currency and serves as the unit of account (one dollar is worth
one unit of consumption). The central bank produces the domestic currency at no cost.
For simplicity we imagine that the central bank controls the price level or, equivalently,
the exchange rate, by standing ready to exchange the domestic currency for goods (or
dollars) at the speciAed price level in period . To avoid arbitrage it is necessary that
the return to holding money between dates and be less than or equal to the return to
holding the safe asset. This implies that the price level must be nondecreasing .
Moreover, since the only function of money, besides its use as a unit of account, is to be a
store of value between dates and , we assume that it is optimal to hold money, that is,
(if then banks would be willing to store goods only).
The deposit contract now promises units of currency to anyone withdrawing in
period and, as before, late withdrawers are residual claimants of whatever is left in the
representative bank in the last period.
We assume that the central bank is benevolent and that it wants to maximize the ex-
pected utility of the representative investor. The central bank knows all public information
available at any date. In particular, the central bank observes the realization of in period
. A central bank policy is therefore a function that determines the price level for any
realization .
We will consider two scenarios. In the Arst, the central bank can commit to a speciAc
monetary policy at period for the rest of the game. In the second, the central bank is
not able to commit to a speciAc policy.
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The commitment scenario can be studied by analyzing the subgame perfect equilibria
(SPE) of the following Fextensive form gameG:
Stage 1: The central bank (CB) chooses a strategy that commits it to a price level
conditional on the asset return . The policy is chosen to maximize the
expected utility of the typical depositor, taking into account the optimal reactions
of the banks and their managers.
Stage 2: Individual banks take the function as given and choose the portfolio
and the nominal contract (similarly to what happens in the last section).
Stage 3: Bank managers choose high ( ) or low ( ) eﬀort to maximize their
own utility.
Stage 4: All uncertainty is resolved and the price level is implemented. Banks
will always choose to continue unless they are insolvent, in which case default is
unavoidable. The consumption allocation is determined by the choice of ,
the price level and whether the banks continue or not.
There is a simple central policy that implements the incentive-eﬃcient allocation with
a banking contract speciAed in nominal terms. Let be the incentive-
eﬃcient solution. Then the price policy for and for
induces the representative bank to choose and implement the plannerKs
allocation, which is feasible. Note that the price level is equal to one for
in which case . In the range the value of the
assets in the bank at is where . This yields
the required consumption for patient consumers and they are willing to
wait. When it is in the interest of late consumers to withdraw at date and the
bank faces nominal claims for the total amount of ( ). The bank cannot meet the
claims because by liquidating it has assets with nominal value (
( . By inLating the price level in the range
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If the central bank can commit to a monetary policy ex ante then the
incentive-eﬃcient solution can be implemented with a banking contract in nominal terms.
This is accomplished by the following central bank price policy: for
and for where is the incentive-eﬃcient solution.
the central bank avoids the ineﬃcient liquidation of the project, reducing the consumption
of early consumers. In the range the central bank refuses to inLate prices further
and the bank must be liquidated.
The fact that these actions result in the incentive-eﬃcient allocation proves that in
equilibrium they are optimal for each of the players. It is optimal that banks default
only when necessary; the incentive constraint ensures that the managerKs eﬀort choice is
optimal; the bankKs choice of is optimal by deAnition, given the function , and
the CB cannot do better than the incentive compatible allocation.
The situation is very diﬀerent if the central bank cannot commit to a monetary policy
at period 0. The no-commitment scenario is represented by the following Fextensive form
gameG.
Stage 1: Individual banks choose the the portfolio and deposit .
Stage 2: Given the choices of the individual banks, bank managers decide whether
to exert high or low eﬀort.
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Alternatively, we could think that the central bank provides help to the bank in the range
in the form of a (zero interest) domestic currency loan. This help avoids a run that forces the
bank to liquidate. Late consumers withdraw at and they end up holding all the money, which they
exchange in period for consumption goods.
The playersK actions are, of course, functions of the information set at which they are chosen. Thus,
strategies are decision rules that map the history of the game into the available action sets. Since there is a
large number of banks, there is a large number of possible information sets. For simplicity, we only consider
information sets in which almost all banks and managers have made the same choices. Further, note that in
our context individual players have no eﬀect on subsequent play of the game. To complete the proof that the
incentive-eﬃcient allocation is the outcome of a SPE, we should specify optimal actions for every possible
subgame (which we will not bother to do here).
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If the central bank cannot commit to a monetary policy ex ante, then the
representative bank is never liquidated and the banker does not exert eﬀort. Competitive
banking delivers an eﬃcient outcome conditional on the banker not exerting eﬀort .
Stage 3: Uncertainty is resolved and the CB chooses a price level conditional on
the asset return .
Stage 4: As before.
At each stage, strategies are functions of the actions chosen at the earlier stages. The
incentive-eﬃcient policy calls for costly liquidation of the project when , but the
incentive-eﬃcient CB policy is time-inconsistent. Eﬀort by the manager has already been
exerted when the decision to continue or discontinue the project has to be made in period
(Stage . Indeed, then it is always optimal to let the project continue. In any SPE, the
CB maximizes the utility of the average depositor by choosing at Stage
and the banks choose to continue at Stage . This implies that
and . This consumption pattern maximizes the utility of
the average depositor. Anticipating that the bank will never be closed down, the manager
does not exert eﬀort ( ) and the bank solves the problem that yields the value
which obtains when the planner chooses the optimal allocation contingent on . The
following proposition summarizes the result.
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VI Banking in a small open economy: The costs
and beneAts of dollarization
However, a currency board is ultimately the creation of the government, which can indeed change the
law or even abolish it altogether. The cost of doing so does not seem to explain the commitment to an
extremely costly policy in states of nature where the incentive to adjust is very strong. One explanation
may be that the act of abandoning the currency board is very obvious, so the governmentKs policy change
is recognized immediately and the beneAts are consequently short-lived. A discretionary monetary policy,
by contrast, allows the government to adjust interest rates, exchange rates, and price levels in response
to privately observed shocks, so it is less clear when there has been a fundamental change in policy. For
instance, it is possible to sustain cooperative outcomes of a repeated game between the government and
foreign investors with the help of a currency board (which makes the moves of the government visible) that
avoid dominated outcomes (which are the only possible if the governmentKs moves are not observable). (See
Gale and Vives [2001] for the sketch of a model.)
We develop now the idea that dollarization may help alleviate the commitment problem
faced by a central bank in a small open economy.
Dollarization represents a commitment precisely because it is costly to reverse. Indeed,
once domestic currency has been replaced by the dollar to go back to a domestic currency
may be very costly. Typically a currency board (where the domestic currency is backed by
dollar reserves) is established by a law of the Parliament (like in Argentina) and therefore
to repeal it would need a legislative change. Authorities cannot then react to a crisis with
a sudden devaluation.
By the same token dollarization may be costly to adopt. The important issue of the
transition to a dollarized system is not considered in the paper but might prove crucial.
Indeed, dollarization could bring the banking system down when implemented in a crisis
context. The tough recent experience of Ecuador comes to mind. To address this issue a
dynamic model would be needed.
Our analysis builds on the fact that dollarization represents a commitment to a limited
use of a LOLR facility. With dollarization a certain amount of help can be pre-arranged.
However, this is typically not suﬃcient to deal with a major banking crisis and may be a
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6.1 Full dollarization
The Fed may face a cost in terms of confounding its monetary policy.
See Vives [2001] for a discussion of Anancial architecture in Europe.
problem because, in case of crisis, the pressure to abolish a currency board, for example,
may be enormous. At the same time a limited capacity to help is fortunate because
otherwise, most likely it would be misused. What other institutional arrangements may
be appropriate to establish a credible LOLR? In a country in which institutions have a
hard time building a reputation the commitment not to help has to be external. The
Federal Reserve will not play a role (it is certainly credible but not willing to help if there
is any potential cost to the operation). Another possible mechanism would be to form a
monetary union with other countries and establish an independent central bank. There are
several issues with this approach, which involves relinquishing political sovereignty. The
Arst is that the countries should form an optimal currency area. The second is that it
is problematic to build an independent central bank for the monetary union of countries
whose central banks have problematic reputations. For example, the European Monetary
Union (EMU) would probably not have arisen if the Bundesbank had not had such strong
anti-inLationary credentials. The third is that the organization of the LOLR in a monetary
union with no central political authority is likely to be contentious. The experience of EMU
points to the diﬃculties that advanced economies with well developed institutions face in
establishing a common central bank. At the present stage in Latin America the avenue
of monetary union does not seem realistic. A similar argument applies to countries in
Eastern Europe or Turkey whose aim is to join the European Union and be members of a
euro zone if they can not join EMU.
Let us consider now a small open economy in which the safe asset is the dollar and the
currency of the country is the peso. The country is small and therefore the only way to
aﬀect the exchange rate is by changing the price level. Indeed, the exchange rate is just
the peso price of consumption. We assume that international borrowing is not possible.
We will consider two scenarios, full dollarization and partial dollarization.
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If the country has a central bank and an independent monetary policy it can control
the price level. However, let us assume, realistically for an LDC or emerging economy,
that the central bank has a commitment problem. The costs of establishing a reputation
for the central bank may be high because of a short eﬀective horizon or a low discount
factor. In this scenario, the value of the banking program (the maximum incentive-feasible
expected utility) is , because the banker will exert no eﬀort ( ). There is no
costly liquidation, the bank never closes down, but returns are drawn from the distribution
.
What happens if the country renounces its monetary autonomy and embraces dollar-
ization? The allocation attained is then identical to the one attained under competitive
banking with real contracts. Indeed, in this scenario there is no central bank to help and
deposits will be held in dollars. The banker will exert eﬀort ( ) but there will be
excessive (costly) liquidation of the project. The value of the banking program is then
.
It is now clear what are the costs and beneAts of dollarization. The beneAt of dollar-
ization is that it imposes discipline by avoiding excessive help from the central bank. It
is feasible then to induce the banker to exert eﬀort. This solves the time-inconsistency
problem of central bank policy at the cost of excessive liquidation of the project (excessive
because help is never available, not even when it is ex ante incentive-eﬃcient).
A necessary condition for dollarization to be good is that a moral hazard problem
for the banker is present. Indeed, the central bank (with no commitment power) will
achieve an eﬃcient allocation when the moral hazard problem of the banker does not exist
( ). Paradoxically, a severe moral hazard problem of the banker ( high) may
hurt the chances of dollarization. We know that is nonincreasing (decreasing) in
(when the incentive constraint binds) while is independent of . When
is high, it becomes expensive to provide incentives and it may be that
Dollarization will be good ( ) when:
1. Eﬀort is important to improve returns ( is Gmuch worseG than for all
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In the presence of a moral hazard problem for the banker, dollarization
will be welfare improving when eﬀort is important to increase returns and
the cost of liquidation is not too high is close to . However, a severe moral hazard
problem ( high) may induce
Note that, contrary to our assumption, we have an unbounded support for with the normal distribution.
When there is no liquidation cost ( ) the central bank may liquidate the bank in period in the
ex ante eﬃcient manner. However, we may also think realistically that in period 1, given that the central
banker will be indiﬀerent between liquidating the bank when and not liquidating it, he will yield to
the pressure of the bank manager and not liquidate it.
Furthermore, there is a conceivable knife-edge case for which . This would happen if
. However, when the distribution of has a two-point support, is a
robust possibility.
). Indeed, the central bank (with no commitment power) will achieve an eﬃcient
allocation when eﬀort makes no diﬀerence ( for all ). For example,
when returns are normally distributed and ,
if and only if is large enough.
2. The cost of liquidation is not too high ( is close to ). When liquidation is not costly
( we have seen that competitive banking can replicate the incentive-eﬃcient
allocation and we get . By continuity then, for close to ,
will be close to Given that is increasing in (and independent
of we will have then that for large, because by assumption
.
Dollarization will tend to be good in countries in which there is a moral hazard problem
and
the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high;
monitoring eﬀort by the banker is important in improving returns;
or the cost of liquidating projects is not very high.
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6.2 Partial dollarization
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It is worth noting that when to demand is not an equilibrium. If all depositors demand
The Arst two features are typical of a country with a long way to go in terms of politi-
cal stability, rule of law, contract enforcement, institutional development, and supervision
and that relies on bank monitoring to make Anance available for entrepreneurial projects.
For politically stable countries with a modern institutional structure and deep Anancial
markets, dollarization is not likely to be a good idea. However, we have also seen that if
the moral hazard problem is very severe dollarization may be welfare reducing. For dollar-
ization to be good the moral hazard problem cannot be hopeless and incentive provision
cannot be extremely costly. This points at an intermediate range of countries with a weak
institutional structure but without an extreme agency problem.
Our results should be contrasted with those on the time consistency of monetary policy
(Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983]). In those models the absence
of commitment leads central banks to choose excessive inLation. The beneAts of dollar-
ization (adopting a stable currency) then increase monotonically with the inLation bias
present in the country [Alesina and Barro 2000b]. In our paper the net beneAts of dollar-
ization (from the perspective of the stability of the banking system) are not monotone in
the severity of the moral hazard problem.
The question arises whether a mixture of partial dollarization and central bank inter-
vention (without assuming commitment) could attain the incentive-eﬃcient solution. The
idea is to combine the Lexibility of domestic-currency contracts with the commitment value
of dollarized contracts. In this way incentive-eﬃciency can be achieved if, and this is a big
if, partial dollarization is credible. This is how it can be accomplished (see Figure III). As
before, let be the incentive-eﬃcient solution. Suppose that depositors
are oﬀered the option of withdrawing pesos or dollars at date . Choose so that
the bank is insolvent and forced to liquidate when . That is, let .
For values of the bank is liquidated and all depositors share the liquidated value
of the assets. For the central bank can oﬀer help by inLating and increasing the
24
( )
( )
( )
∈ 
 



p r
d > D/p r .
d p r
0
1
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0
0
0
1
0
1
0 0
0
( ) = ( ) = ( )
1
(0 1) 1 (1 )
= + (1 ) = ( + )
(1 )
+ (1 ) ( ) = ( ) ( ) = +
D/p r c r > d, D y /. D, d
d .
 , ,  D d
d r x y  D y / r x y
r < r
 y /x
> r r
d  D/p r c r c r rx y .
r < r
and the central bank adjusts so that the bank is solvent, then an individual thinks that he can obtain
This is so because a single individual cannot aﬀect the solvency of the bank (and therefore he
compares the value of the two options and assuming that the bank is solvent).
price level (depreciating the currency) so that depositors consume the optimal amount
where The contract would be oﬀered then by a
competitive bank. The crucial aspect of the banking contract is the right of depositors to
demand dollars back at date
This is only one of the many ways to implement the incentive-eﬃcient allocation with
partial dollarization. Indeed, any scheme which allows depositors to maintain a percentage
of their endowment in dollars to obtain, at date in pesos and in
dollars with and will implement the incentive-
eﬃcient allocation with an appropriate central bank policy. As before, for the bank
is liquidated and all depositors share the liquidated value of the assets; for
the central bank oﬀers help by inLating so that depositors consume the optimal
amount , with
Partial dollarization presents two problems. The Arst problem is credibility. Indeed,
partial dollarization is easier to reverse that full dollarization. For example, whenever
the banker may insist to the central bank that dollar convertibility be suspended
and the bank saved. The argument is powerful: It is ex post eﬃcient to do so. With
civil servants and politicians with short horizons the incentive consequences of the help are
not internalized. The second problem is of a dynamic nature and cannot be captured by
our model. Once banks accept dollar deposits they are likely to make dollar denominated
loans to domestic residents to avoid exchange rate risk and because they have a comparative
advantage serving domestic customers (see Calvo [2000]). In this case when the central
bank helps by inLating teh currency it may cause a devaluation and may bankrupt dollar
indebted households. We would then have the result that access to the peso printing press
may magnify the banking stability problem. The problem may be compounded by self-
fulAlling expectations of a banking crisis. Households anticipate that in case of crisis the
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Credibility of the central bank
VII From theory to measurement and policy
money supply will be expanded, inLation will accelerate and households will demand high
nominal interest rates, which will translate into high real rates (this is the Gpeso problemG).
The result is a further weakening of the banking system. This may have happened in the
recent banking crisis in Ecuador.
These considerations point at the potential instability of partial dollarization without
external help providing credibility to the program.
We have identiAed a series of theoretical forces that go for and against dollarization.
The question arises about how to measure them: What observable variables can we look
at to check whether for a particular country dollarization is a good idea from the point of
view of banking stability? In this section we put the model to work by
establishing a link between the parameters in our model and observable country
variables; and
assessing what countries would beneAt most with dollarization.
We will consider a universe of countries where dollarization may be an issue and from
which we have been able to gather some data. We concentrate attention on Latin America
and South East Asia although we consider also Turkey in the periphery of Europe. Those
countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and
Venezuela in Latin America; Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in East Asia; and Turkey.
In the following we discuss possible, of necessity crude, measures of the determinants
of the welfare analysis of dollarization: credibility of the central bank, moral hazard,
importance of eﬀort for returns, and cost of liquidation of projects.
. To assess the overall credibility/reputation of a central
bank is not easy. We will use here the ranking on central bank independence of 46 countries
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Moral hazard
This ranking is inLation-based and weights the three indexes according to their relative contribution in
explaining the variations in the rate of depreciation of the value of the currency.
See Table 21.1 in Cukierman [1992].
See Table 19.4 in Cukierman [1992]. While the legal or institutional indexes of central bank independence
do not appear to be correlated with inLation in LDCs, the turnover rate of governors is (see Cukierman,
Webb and Neyapti [1992]; the results are conArmed by Fry [1998]).
during the 1980s elaborated by Cukierman [1992] and based on a combined index of legal
independence, actual turnover of the governors and a response by experts to a question-
naire. Among the countries we consider in this section, at the bottom of the ranking
appear Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Turkey, Venezuela, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, South Korea
and Indonesia. Above those we have the Philippines and Thailand. If we look only at
the actual turnover of governors (for the period 1950-1989) as an index of credibility, the
picture is not very diﬀerent with the highest average turnover rates per annum for Ar-
gentina, Uruguay, South Korea, Turkey, Chile, Singapore, Peru and Venezuela. Thailand,
Colombia, Mexico, the Philippines and Malaysia have more moderate rates (from .20 to
.13).
Except perhaps for the Philippines and Thailand the indicators point to an important
credibility problem for the central bank. In any case, note that the Philippines have the
same level of overall central bank independence as Kenya, and Thailand has the same level
as Greece. It must be pointed out however that developments in the 1990s may qualify
the picture for some countries (for example, in Chile).
. The severity of the moral hazard problem, indexed in our model by
could be proxied by the battery of legal indicators reLecting the rule of law in
diﬀerent countries of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny [1998]. Those include
indicators of the eﬃciency of the judiciary system, rule of law proper (Glaw and order
traditionG of the country), corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of contract repudiation
by the government, as well as a rating on accounting standards. Low marks on these
indicators would suggest a severe moral hazard problem for the banker. For example,
in countries with poorly deAned or poorly defended property rights, some of the bankKs
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The importance of eﬀort
Cost of liquidation
Data on accounting standards is not available for Ecuador.
Source: Financial Structure and Development Database of the World Bank with data from 1997.
marginal returns will be captured by others, which increases the marginal cost of ensuring
high returns. We classify the marks given in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998) into low, medium and high (Table I).
We summarize in Table II the results of aggregating country performance according
to the diﬀerent indicators in three levels of the moral hazard problem: severe, signiAcant,
and moderate. Peru, Indonesia and Philippines have a severe moral hazard problem (with
3 or 4 low marks). Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Uruguay have a signiAcant but not extreme moral hazard
problem (with at most one low mark). Venezuela (with two low marks) and Uruguay (at
the boundary of the Low region of Table I, with 5 points, in Rule of Law and Corruption)
are boundary cases between the GsevereG and GsigniAcantG regions. Hong Kong, Malaysia,
and Singapore receive high marks and have a moderate moral hazard problem.
. The importance of eﬀort by bank managers for project returns
can be proxied by the relevance of banks in the Anancial system. This can be measured
by the amount of bank assets to total Anancial assets. In the countries of our sample only
South Korea is below .50 (with no data for Hong Kong, Indonesia and Singapore). For
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, the Philippines and Taiwan is above .80.
Note that there is a link between the (indirect) moral hazard indicators given before
(related to the rule of law and accounting standards) and the importance of eﬀort by the
banking manager to obtain returns. In countries with a severe or signiAcant moral hazard
problem with the Arms in the private sector, suggested by low marks in the rule of law
indexes, eﬀort by the bank manager will also be important. This means that, perhaps with
exception of Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, eﬀort to obtain returns is bound to be
important in our set of countries.
. The cost of liquidation of projects is somewhat more diﬃcult to
proxy. One approximation is to think that high creditorsK rights are linked with a lower
cost of liquidation of projects. In this respect we have that Colombia, Mexico, Peru and
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It is worth noting that creditor rights tend to be stronger in poorer countries (possibly to facilitate
secured lending where there are no other Anancing opportunities). In the score system of La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny [1998, Table 4] for a maximum of 4 points we consider low rights 0, medium
1-2 and high 3-4 points, respectively.
See Rajan and Zingales [1998] for related indicators.
Source: World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Taiwan is not in the database.
Source: Financial Structure and Development Database of the World Bank.
Although Venezuela gets 40 points, at the boundary of the Medium region in Table 1.
the Philippines have low rights; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Turkey, Uruguay, Taiwan and
Venezuela have medium rights; and Ecuador, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
South Korea, and Indonesia have high rights.
A complementary indicator of the liquidation cost is the level of development of the
Anancial system. Indeed we may think that more developed Anancial systems can cope
better with adverse selection problems at the root of costly liquidation. A crude proxy
for the level of Anancial development is the amount of credit to the private sector over
GDP. In 1998 Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela were no more than .25;
Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay close to .35; Ecuador, Indonesia, and the Philippines close
to .50; Chile and South Korea in the .60-.75 range; and Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore
and Thailand above 1. Of the countries considered Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Turkey, Uruguay, South Korea and Venezuela were below the .25 threshold for stock market
capitalization over GDP in 1997. Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia were at about .30, Thailand
around .40, the Philippines at .70 and Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan above
1 (with Chile close). In terms of accounting standards (Table I), another indicator of
Anancial development, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela obtain low marks.
We summarize the level of Anancial development in three categories: low if both the
amount of credit to the private sector over GDP and stock market capitalization over
GDP are below 25 percent and if accounting standards are low; high if the amount of
credit to the private sector over GDP is above (or not far from) 50 percent and stock
market capitalization over GDP is above 40 percent; and medium otherwise. With this
aggregation procedure we And that Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela are in the low category;
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Assessment
This would be consistent with the better-than-expected recovery of South East Asia from the recent
Anancial crisis.
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia in the
medium one; and Chile, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Taiwan in the high one.
Putting together the two sets of indicators we arrive at an estimate of the cost of
liquidation provided in Table III. We will say that the cost of liquidation is high if the
country obtains a low mark in both indicators; medium-high if the country obtains medium-
medium or medium-low marks; medium-low if the country obtains at least one high mark:
and low if the country obtains two high marks.
Altogether we may suspect therefore a high cost of liquidation of projects in Peru; im-
portant for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Turkey; moder-
ate for Ecuador, Chile, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia; and low for Hong
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. It is interesting to note the regional diﬀerence
between Latin America and East Asia.
. These indicators, taken together, point to a middle range of countries
where dollarization can be a good idea from the point of view of banking stability. Those
countries are at the intersection of signiAcant or moderate levels of the moral hazard prob-
lem (Table II) with medium or low levels of the cost of liquidation (Table III). Among them
we can highlight some Latin American countries, like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador and Mexico (but not Peru and both Venezuela and Uruguay are borderline), as
well as some East Asian tigers, like Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan
and Thailand (but not Indonesia and the Philippines), and Turkey. Peru, Indonesia and
the Philippines (and perhaps Venezuela and even Uruguay) are discarded because of the
extreme severity of the moral hazard problem to which a potentially large cost of project
liquidation is added for Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The beneAts of dollarization to
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore are moderated by the relatively lower importance of
monitoring eﬀort to improve returns in those economies.
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Despite this the costs of dollarization (in terms of costly liquidation of assets) are not
uniform with the East Asia tigers, Ecuador and Chile being on the light side, while the
costs will be heavier for Argentina, Mexico and Turkey as well as for Brazil and Colombia.
It would be interesting to compare the results obtained with the implications of the
theory of optimal currency areas for individual countries. The countries that should tend
to abandon their currency are those that have a history of high and variable inLation (lack
of domestic commitment ability); a large volume of international trade (particularly with
the anchor country); a cycle that co-moves with the anchor; and stable relative prices
with the anchor [Alesina and Barro 2000a]. According to these criteria the yen does not
look appealing as a potential anchor, except perhaps for Indonesia. For Central America,
Mexico and Ecuador the US dollar is the best anchor. The same is true for Canada, the
Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore. For South America, the choice of anchor is not
so clear. For example, for Argentina the euro could work also. For Western and Eastern
Europe as well as most of Africa the euro is the candidate anchor.
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VIII Concluding Remarks
We have provided a preliminary analysis of the costs and beneAts of dollarization in
controlling moral hazard in the presence of a time-inconsistency problem in central bank
policy.
The basic results point to a middle range of countries where to dollarize is a good idea
from the point of view of the stability of the banking system. This includes some Latin
American countries, like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico (but
not Peru, and Uruguay and Venezuela are doubtful), as well as some East Asian tigers,
like Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (but not Indonesia and
the Philippines), and Turkey. However, the costs of dollarization are not equal for all
countries, with the East Asia tigers, Ecuador and Chile on the light side, while the costs
can be much higher for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Turkey. It is interesting
to notice that, according to our analysis, Ecuador would qualify for dollarization from the
perspective of the stability of the banking system. Meanwhile IMF oﬃcials were openly
skeptical about the process. Dollarization is not good for countries where the moral hazard
problem is extreme.
We should warn the reader however that our model can be used only as a Arst screening
device to assess the costs and beneAts of dollarization for the stability of the banking
system. A deeper country by country study should be conducted to reach a more deAnitive
policy conclusion.
Given that dollarization has costs in terms of excessive liquidation welfare could be
improved either with a partial and credible dollarization or with the intervention of an
international LOLR like a reformed IMF. Let us explore the potential role of the IMF.
The central problem of implementing the incentive-eﬃcient solution is how to provide
help without losing the commitment capacity to avoid helping when ex ante eﬃciency
requires it. An independent IMF may be just what is needed. This is how it could be
done. The IMF could provide a loan only when the country has enough collateral (more
than in terms of our model). The IMF should provide help in the range
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The reason is that the IMF is seen as preferred creditor and therefore not repaying the IMF means
essentially being denied access to the international capital market [Fischer 1999].
Including, among other things, that the country meets, or move in the direction of meeting, international
standards (in information provision in particular, Special Data Dissemination Standards).
See Chapman [1999] and Moreno-Villalaz [1999].
Obviously to determine the minimum required amount of collateral
(and the range where help has to be provided) a supervisory knowledge of the (relevant
parameters of the) economy is needed and therefore the IMF should have supervisory
capacity. What is interesting is that the reason why a minimum amount of collateral is
needed for help is not to secure the loan but to impose a threshold below which help is
not given. Although the IMF can ask for collateral it rarely does so. Instead the IMF
requires Gpolicy conditionalityG for the loan. However, according to our analysis, what
makes sense is conditionality in terms of rule of law and accounting standards because it
avoids lending to countries where the moral hazard problem is hopeless.
This requires an IMF with a statute which provides independence (along the lines, for
example, of De Gregorio, Eichengreen, Ito, and Wyplosz [1998]). This is crucial to avoid
granting help when it is not ex ante eﬃcient to do so and therefore contributing to moral
hazard. In summary, a reformed IMF would need to be independent, lend on the basis of
collateral, and require a minimal institutional infrastructure for the country.
To be sure, another line of argument would insist that with dollarization the domestic
banking system will fall into foreign hands anyway and therefore bailouts could be provided
by strong international banks supervised abroad and supported by their respective central
banks. Indeed, local banks are being bought in Latin America by strong international
banks (with solid collateral). This solution has been successful in a country like Panama
where there is no LOLR facility except for, seemingly, a large US bank. However, it
is doubtful that international banking can be the sole answer to the problem. This is
because the private incentives of the international banks and those of foreign LOLR and
supervisors are not in line with local interests. Indeed, neither a private bank nor a foreign
supervisor will take into account the consequences (systemic or not) for domestic residents
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See Vives [2001] for an analysis of similar problems in the European context.
of a restructuring of a local branch or subsidiary. At the same time the headquarters
of foreign banks may want to limit the exposure to a country which may face a currency
crisis, therefore tightening liquidity provision to the branches of the bank in the country
in question.
The market failure that the IMF is addressing is derived from the lack of commitment
capacity of domestic institutions. The view [Chari and Kehoe 1998] that an International
LOLR is not needed because the joint action of the Fed, the ECB and the BoJ can take
care of any international liquidity problem does not take into account problems that may
be systemic in small dollarized countries but non-systemic worldwide. We believe therefore
that there is room for an International LOLR.
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
INSEAD and INSTITUT DKANÀLISI ECONÒMICA, CSIC
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Table I
RULE OF LAW: ENFORCEMENT VARIABLES ACCOUNTING
Efficiency of Rule of law Corruption Risk of Risk of Contract Rating on
judicial system expropiation repudiation accounting
standards
Low x < 5 Turkey Colombia Mexico ----------- Argentina x ≤ 40 Peru
Peru Peru Peru Uruguay
Indonesia Venezuela Venezuela
Philippines Indonesia Philippines
Thailand Philippines Indonesia
Philippines
Medium 5 ≤ x ≤ 7 Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Brazil 40 < x ≤ 60 Argentina
Brazil Brazil Brazil Colombia Chile Brazil
Ecuador Chile Chile Ecuador Ecuador Chile
Mexico Ecuador Colombia Peru Mexico Colombia
Peru México Ecuador Uruguay Venezuela Mexico
Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Venezuela
Venezuela Venezuela Turkey Turkey
Turkey Turkey
South Korea Turkey Indonesia
Taiwan South Korea Philippines
Malaysia Taiwan
South Korea Thailand
Thailand
High x > 7 Chile Hong Kong Hong Kong Brazil Colombia 60 < x ≤ 90 Hong Kong
Colombia Singapore Malaysia Chile Uruguay Malaysia
Taiwan Singapore Mexico Philippines
Hong Kong Hong Kong Singapore
Malaysia Hong Kong Malaysia South Korea
Singapore Indonesia Singapore Taiwan
Malaysia South Korea Thailand
Singapore Taiwan
South Korea Thailand
Taiwan
Thailand
Developed countries Developed countries Developed countries Developed countries Developed countries Developed countries 
(except Italy, Portugal (except Greece) (except Italy) (except Greece) (except Greece, Portugal and Austria)
and Spain)
Mean of Scan.=10.0 Mean of Scan. = 10.0 Mean of Scan. = 10.0 Mean of Scan. = 9.7 Mean of Scan. = 9.4 Mean of Scan. = 74.0
Mean of German =  8.5 Mean of German = 8.7 Mean of German = 8.0 Mean of German = 9.5 Mean of German = 9.5 Mean of German = 62.7
Source: Table 5 in La Porta et al [1998]
TABLE II
MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
Severe
Significant
Moderate
Peru, Indonesia, Philippines
Venezuela, Uruguay
Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore
Classification of countries in three categories according to the level of moral hazard obtained by aggregating a battery of
legal indicators plus accounting standards.(Venezuela and Uruguay are borderline between the Severe and the Significant regions.)
TABLE III
COST OF LIQUIDATION
High
Medium-high
Medium-low
Low
Peru
Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico
Uruguay, Venezuela, Turkey
Ecuador, Chile, Philippines
South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand
Classification of countries in four categories according to the level of the cost of liquidation of projects
obtained by aggregating indicators of creditors rights and of the level of development of the financial system.
